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Abstract
We study the firm’s strategic choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a managerial delegation
framework where a multiproduct corporation competes against a single plant firm. We examine simultaneous-
move versus sequential-move in output choices when CSR decisions are simultaneous. We show that both
firms adopt CSR in a simultaneous-move game, whereas only the follower firm adopts CSR (but not the leader
firm) in sequential-move games. We also consider an endogenous timing game in output choices between the
two firms and show that a simultaneous-move is an equilibrium when the products are substitutes or weak
complements, while a single plant firm’s leadership is an equilibrium when the products are sufficiently strong
complements. Our findings can explain the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different
industries in which firms’ CSR activities are more or less (even non-CSR or negative CSR) commonly
widespread. It also partially helps us understand CSR’s strategic motives and its relations with the firm’s
profits.
Keyword: corporate social responsibility; managerial delegation; multiproduct corporation; endogenous
timing game
JEL Classification: L13; M14; D21
1. Introduction
The increasing emergence of adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by the oligopolistic
firms has been observed worldwide. As it has gained a higher profile on the political, economic, and business
agendas in recent years, CSR has received increased attention from academics.1 It is generally understood
in the constitutive approach that CSR is an element of corporate governance as a social norm, based on5
the social contract. That is, firms have to meet the altruistic needs, and hence corporate governance is at
least in part about managerial compliance with legal requirements surrounding CSR. It is then desirable for
Email addresses: arturo.garciam@udlap.mx (Arturo Garcia), mariellealc@tec.mx (Mariel Leal), sangho@jnu.ac.kr
(Corresponding author) (Sang-Ho Lee)
1In particular, the academic debate on the expansive CSR wave has been raised more frequently in the fields of management,
business ethics, law, and economics. For example, Wood (1991) examined corporate law while Carroll (1991, 1999) emphasized
corporate governance. For recent research in the literature of economics, see Schreck (2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012),
Crifo and Forget (2015), Hirose et al. (2017), and works cited therein.
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firms to create fiduciary relationships with all their stakeholders beyond the shareholders and to satisfy the
interests of all stakeholders.
In this stakeholder theory, the stakeholders exercise public pressure concerning the firm’s objectives,10
whereas private owners make the firm’s strategic choices such as price, output capacity, product location,
advertising, and R&D. In particular, when the stakeholders’ participation in governance applies to market
decisions, CSR can be interpreted as part of consumer surplus (or consumer-friendliness) and thus, when a
firm adopts CSR, the level of social concern is taken as exogenously given, for instance, by the customary
toughness of the stakeholders. Accordingly, researchers have increasingly investigated various aspects of15
altruistic CSR in which the CSR is regarded as consumer-friendly behaviors and its level is an exogenously
given variable that was a normative goal established in the social contract.2
On the other hand, Baron (2001) made a pioneering contribution to strategic CSR, in which CSR can
be used to avoid political pressure from activists who might attempt to organize a boycott. Then, CSR can
be an instrument of the firm’s strategic variables to maximize their profits. For example, Reinhardt and20
Stavins (2010) and Manasakis et al. (2014, 2018) showed that CSR might be a business strategy that reflects
management’s incentive contracts if customers are willing to pay for ethical goods, which may be profitable.
Most global firms focus a fair amount of attention on image signaling concerns and thus provide incentives
for employee engagement in community service, boosting their public relations with local communities and
attracting motivated employees in the local country.25
Given that the firms compete for the same customers in the same industry, it can be reasonably assumed
that the level of social engagement under the stakeholder’s request is identical for all firms in a similar
industry. However, it is widely observed that firms adopting CSR may present different levels of engagement
in CSR activities; moreover, the simultaneous presence of CSR and non-CSR firms within the same industry
occurs. This might be mainly because profits with CSR would be reduced in the case of oligopoly competition30
where the firms’ strategic interaction exists.3
In the context of oligopolistic competition, recent works have formulated a delegation framework relevant
to the strategic choice of the level of CSR from strategic motivations for adopting CSR behaviors. Plenty
of works assumed an asymmetric market organization where CSR adoption can be endogenously chosen,
but only some firms adopt CSR among all firms. For example, Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al. (2019)35
showed that the unilateral adoption of CSR might increase the profits of the CSR-initiated firm in the
homogeneous product market. Dong and Wang (2019), Bárcena-Ruiz et al. (2020), and ? also considered
a market structure with multiproduct firms and showed that profit maximization could motivate a firm to
2For recent works on the normative approach of CSR, see Liu et al. (2015), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Fanti and
Buccella (2017), Leal et al. (2018, 2019), and Xu and Lee (2019).
3Several works showed that CSR firms might earn higher or lower profits under CSR activities, but a higher level of CSR
might not be beneficial to society. For more discussions in the different context, see Goering (2012), Kopel and Brand (2012),
Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015), Fanti and Buccella (2017, 2019), Kim et al. (2019), and Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2020)
among others.
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integrate with other firms and engage in CSR. They conclude that the effect of adopting unilateral CSR is
to accelerate product market competition in the vein of the delegation game with managers.40
Recent works also extend to a competitive managerial delegation game in which competitive firms choose
the strategic level of CSR endogenously. For example, Bian et al. (2016), Hino and Zennyo (2017), and Fanti
and Buccella (2017, 2019) examined an endogenous choice of adopting CSR. However, they confined into
the symmetric market configuration of oligopoly competition and revealed that all firms adopt a positive
CSR level in the market equilibrium. Hirose et al. (2020, 2017) and Lee and Park (2019) investigated the45
strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) of polluting firms and showed that firms will
adopt ECSR simultaneously or sequentially to mitigate price competition and earn higher profits. In their
analysis, however, the economic role of some critical parameters such as product differentiation, economies
of scale, multiproduct firms are limited.4 As a result, the firms’ endogenous heterogeneity regarding the
strategic choice of CSR cannot be fully explained. To our knowledge, mainly, studies on the asymmetric50
equilibrium of strategic CSR in an endogenous choice game with a multiproduct corporation are scarce.
In this paper, we examine the firm’s strategic choice of CSR in a competitive managerial delegation
framework in which a multiproduct company competes vis-a-vis a single plant one. This asymmetric model
formulation follows the work by Dong and Wang (2019) and Garcia et al. (2020a,b) in which product substi-
tutability or complementarity plays a vital role in determining CSR’s strategic level. We then examine and55
compare simultaneous output choices and sequential output choices when CSR decisions are simultaneous.
We further consider an endogenous timing game in output choices between the two firms and figure out how
the game’s timing will affect the firm’s strategic choice of asymmetric CSR.
We show that both firms adopt CSR when output decisions are simultaneous, whereas only one firm
adopts CSR in sequential moves. It implies that CSR’s adoption might bring about a more intensive product60
market competition, but the relations between the differentiated products and the inter-firm interaction
between the multiproduct corporation and its rival with single plant are crucial to determine CSR’s strategic
level.
First, in a simultaneous move where both firms adopt CSR, an increasing product substitutability leads
the multiproduct corporation to choose a higher level of CSR, which is stronger with substitute than with65
complement products. As a response, single plant firm decreases its CSR level as the substitutability in-
creases. Since the higher weight attached to the consumer’s surplus induces an aggressive market behavior
of the corporation via output expansion, the rival firm decreases its output production. We also show that
the multiproduct corporation might choose negative level of CSR, so called Corporate Social IrResponsibility
(CSiR),5 when the products are sufficiently strong complements. As a result, multiproduct corporation gets70
4Kumar (1992) and Eckel and Neary (2010) point out that one characteristic of current economies is the presence of
multiproduct firms and economies of scale. In the literature of CSR, the heterogeneity of objectives among multiproducts firms
has also emerged as an important research topic in recent literature of CSR. See Garcia et al. (2020a,b), Kim et al. (2019),
Dong and Wang (2019) and Bárcena-Ruiz et al. (2020) among others.
5CSiR is understood as being reactive as opposed to proactive in addressing corporate issues in relation to CSR that often
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higher profits than single plant firm but both firm’s profits decrease with substitutability.
Second, in a sequential-move game where only one firm adopts CSR, it adopts non-zero CSR when its
rival firm takes a leadership. That is, the leading firm does not adopt CSR under its output leadership
position because it already has the first-mover advantage, and thus it can strategically commit and choose
its output. This implies that the first-mover advantage in the stage of output choice induces no-CSR, and75
thus the profit-oriented CSR is not effective in the strategic managerial delegation game when the firm
has a first-mover advantage in the sequential-move game. This finding is similar to the work by Hino
and Zennyo (2017), who examined a homogeneous product duopoly market and showed that a leader does
not adopt CSR while a follower adopts a positive CSR when they regard CSR as a concern about social
welfare, instead of consumer surplus.6 However, if both firms consider consumer surplus as CSR in their80
model, they choose a positive CSR level, but the leader always chooses a higher level of CSR than that of a
follower. This implies that the leader produces output more aggressively than that in a simultaneous-move
game with homogeneous products between symmetric firms. However, our analysis with a multiproduct firm
creates contrasting findings that the leader has no profit-motivated CSR activities in a sequential-move game
irrespective of product substitutability.85
Third, we show that both firms might decrease their outputs in both simultaneous and sequential games,
compared with no delegation case, even with a higher level of CSR. This contrasts with the unilateral case
where only one firm adopts CSR, wherein the increase of CSR level always implies an aggressive output
production of the firm. However, in a competitive bilateral case where both firms choose the level of CSR
competitively, due to the strategic substitutes effect, it will not always increase its output production at90
equilibrium where the rival’s CSR is endogenously taken into consideration.
Finally, we examine an endogenous timing game and show that a simultaneous move is an equilibrium
when the products are substitutes or weak complements, whereas a sequential move by the single plant firm’s
leadership is an equilibrium when the products are sufficiently strong complements. Hence, both firms adopt
CSR unless the products are sufficiently strong complements. This implies that modeling with a unilateral95
approach where only one firm adopts CSR in a simultaneous-move game is problematic when the products
are substitutes. We also show that in the equilibrium with a sequential move in an endogenous timing game,
the multiproduct corporation will be a follower but might choose a negative CSR level, i.e., CSiR. This also
implies that in a unilateral model where only one firm adopts CSR, the strategic relations between CSR and
CSiR should be incorporated to understand the strategic motivation of CSR.100
Our findings can explain the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different industries in
occurs when the things are perceived as having ”gone wrong.” For recent conceptional discussions in management literature,
see Jones et al. (2009) and Riera and Iborra (2017).
6Their findings are closely related to a mixed market configuration in which the welfare-maximizing public firm compete
with a profit-maximizing private firm. Then, the private firm chooses a leader position to achieve the highest profits while the
public firm chooses a follower position to achieve the highest welfare in an endogenous choice of market role with homogeneous
products. See, for example, Ino and Matsumura (2010), Matsumura and Ogawa (2010), and Chen et al. (2019).
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which firms’ CSR activities are more or less (even non-CSR or negative CSR) commonly widespread. It also
partially helps us understand CSR’s strategic motives and its relations with the firm’s profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic duopoly model with
multiproduct firms deciding the level of CSR. Section 3 describes the fixed timing game analysis, and Section105
4 discusses an endogenous timing game. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Model
We consider two differentiated products markets with a CSR-corporation, A, which has two plants and
produces goods in market 1 and 2, denoted by A1 and A2, respectively, and a single plant consumer-friendly
(CF) firm that produces only product 1, denoted by B1.110
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. Following Singh and Vives
(1982), the representative consumer has a utility function U(q1, q2), which is quadratic, strictly concave and
symmetric in q1 and q2: U(q1, q2) = (q1 + q2)− ((q
2
1 +2γq1q2 + q
2
2))/2, where γ ∈ [−1, 1], q1 = qA1 + qB1 and
q2 = qA2 are the quantity of good 1 and 2, respectively, and qki is the output produced by firm or plant ki,
k = A,B; i = 1, 2. The consumer maximizes U(q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2, where pi is the price of good i. Then,
the inverse demand functions are linear and given by:
p1 = 1− (qA1 + qB1)− γqA2, p2 = 1− qA2 − γ(qA1 + qB1); (1)
where parameter γ (−1 ≤ γ ≤ 1) measures the degree of product differentiation. The products are regarded
as complements if γ < 0, substitutes if γ > 0 and independent if γ = 0.
On the supply side, we assume that firms have identical technologies with decreasing return to scale
represented by the following quadratic cost function: C(qki) =
q2
ki
2 , k = A,B; i = 1, 2. The profit function
of plants of firms are given by:
πAi = piqAi −
q2Ai
2
, i = 1, 2 (2)
πB1 = p1qB1 −
q2B1
2
(3)
and the profit of the multiplant CSR-corporation is:
πA = πA1 + πA2 (4)
We consider a competitive managerial delegation model, in which the owners and managers are separated
in both the CSR-corporation and the CF firm. To maximize the joint profits (profits), the owner of the CSR-
corporation (CF firm) specifies an incentive contract with the manager. The CSR-corporation’s manager
is assumed to maximize the joint profits of its two plants plus a fraction (θA) of consumer surplus (CS) in
production, whereas the CF firm manager maximizes the profits of its plant plus a fraction (θB) of consumer
surplus (CS) in production. Thus, the objective function of the manager of CSR-corporation (CF firm) is
5
given by, respectively:
VA = πA + θACS (5)
VB = πB1 + θBCS (6)
where CS = ((qA1 + qB1)
2 + 2γ(qA1 + qB1)(qA2) + q
2
A2)/2. Note that parameter θk ∈ [−1, 1] k = A,B.
represents the extent to which firm k adopts either CSR (θk > 0) or CSiR (θk < 0) activities specified in the
incentive contract.115
Our goal is to study the firms’ strategic choice of CSR in a managerial delegation framework in which
the firms have the profit-increasing CSR motives in a multiproduct duopoly model. We also examine an
endogenous timing game in output choices between the two asymmetric firms and figure out how the timing
of the game and the degree of product differentiation will affect the firm’s strategic level of CSR.
The setting is a multi-stage game. In the first stage, both firms simultaneously and independently set120
up the managerial incentive scheme, θk, to maximize their profits. In the second stage, firms compete with
outputs: the manager of the CSR-corporation chooses the outputs given θA prescribed in the first stage to
maximize his objective function, whereas the manager of CF firm chooses its output, given θB , to maximize
its objective function. In this stage of output choice, we have either simultaneous or sequential choice. We
will first examine the fixed timing game and then analyze an endogenous timing game.125
3. Fixed timing game
3.1. Simultaneous choice in an output stage
In the last stage, we solve equilibrium output decisions of the game. The manager of the CSR-corporation
A chooses the outputs qA1 and qA2 that maximise eqn. (5). CF firm B1 chooses the output qB1 that
maximises eqn. (6), respectively.130
According the first-order conditions, the best response functions of the firms are derived as
qA1 =
1 + γqA2 (−2 + θA) + qB1 (−1 + θA)
3− θA
qA2 =
1 + γqA1 (−2 + θA) + γqB1 (−1 + θA)
3− θA
qB1 =
1 + qA1 (−1 + θB) + γqA2 (−1 + θB)
3− θB
(7)
From (7), it is easy to see that output of plant A1 decreases with that of B1, whereas the output produced
by plant A2 decreases (increases) with that of B1 if γ > (<)0. Similarly, the output of B1 decreases with
that of plant A1, whereas it decreases (increases) with that of plant A2 if γ > (<)0. Solving them, we obtain
the following Lemma.7
7
Ni is provided in Appendix A
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Lemma 1. Under a simultaneous output competition, we obtain the following equilibrium outputs and profits:
qA1 =
6−5γ+γ2+(−1+γ2)θ2A+(−3+γ+γ
2)θB+θA(1+2γ−2γ2−(−1+γ2)θB)
∆1
, qA2 =
8−6γ+(−2+3γ)θA+(−2+γ)θB
∆1
qB1 =
(3−2γ+(−1+γ)θA)(2+γ−(1+γ)θA+(1+γ)θB)
∆1
πA =
N1
2∆21
, πB1 =
N2
2∆21
where ∆1 ≡ 24− 11γ
2 − 2
(
−1 + γ2
)
θ2A + 3
(
−2 + γ2
)
θB − 2θA
(
7− 5γ2 +
(
−1 + γ2
)
θB
)
> 0.135
By Lemma 1, other things being equal, it can be easily checked that qA1 increases with θA whereas qB1
decreases with θA, and that qB1 increases with θB whereas qA1 decreases with θB . If the level of CSR is
given, since the higher weight attached to the consumer’s surplus induces an aggressive market behavior of
the firm via output expansion, the rival firm decreases its output production. A firm’s higher CSR leads
to its increasing output but decreasing the rival firm’s output in the competitive market 1. Note that total140
output in market 1 will be increased as θA increases; however, the effect of CSR on the monopolistic market
2 depends on the degree of product differentiation. In particular, qA2 decreases with θA when products are
sufficiently strong complements, whereas it increases (decreases) with θB when products are complements
(substitutes).
In the first stage of the game, firms’ owners simultaneously choose θA and θB to maximize their respective145
profits which are given by Lemma 1. The equilibrium strategies at the first stage of the game are found as
a solution to the following system of two equations: ∂πA
∂θA
= 0 and ∂πB1
∂θB
= 0. However, it is impossible to
derive explicit equilibrium values because of mathematical complexity. In the below, in order to have an
explicit comparison, we will now use a numerical analysis to show equilibrium outcomes. The results of the
calculations for various levels of γ are given in Table 1. In particular, Figure 1 shows that the competitive150
levels of strategic CSR depends on the degree of product differentiation, which have opposite direction
between the two firms.
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes in a simultaneous choice
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Figure 1: Strategic level of CSR in a simultaneous choice
Proposition 1. Under a simultaneous output competition in a managerial delegation game, we have that
(a) θsmA decreases when γ ≤ γ0 ≈ −0.987, otherwise, it increases. θ
sm
B is a convex function of γ, which
first decrease when the products are complements and then increases in the vicinity of γ = 35 . Also, let155
γ1 ∈
(
2
5 ,
1
2
)
satisfy θsmA = θ
sm
B , then θ
sm
A
>
<
θsmB if γ
>
<
γ1, whereas θ
sm
A becomes positive in the vicinity of
γ = − 45 and θ
sm
B is always positive.
(b) qsmAi , i = 1, 2., decreases monotonically with γ whereas q
sm
B1 is a convex function of γ, which first decreases
and then increases in the vicinity of γ = 910 . Also, q
sm
A1 ≤ q
sm
A2 , and let γ2 ∈
(
−
1
5 ,−
1
10
)
satisfy qsmA1 = q
sm
B1 ,
then qsmA1
<
>
qsmB1 if γ
>
<
γ2.160
(c) πsmA > π
sm
B1 > 0 and each firm’s profit decreases with γ.
Proposition 1 (a) states that the strategic levels of CSR between the firms in a simultaneous output choice
game are inversely proportional to each other. That is, CSR is a strategic substitute between the firms in the
managerial delegation. In particular, increasing product substitutability leads the multiproduct corporation
to choose a higher level of CSR, which is stronger with substitute than with complement products. As a165
response, firm B decreases its CSR level, whereas firm A increases its level as the substitutability increases.
Two extreme cases are noteworthy. First, when the products are sufficiently substitutes, θsmA > θ
sm
B , i.e.,
firm A will choose a higher level of CSR than that of firm B. Note that even though the higher weight is
attached to the consumer’s surplus, it does not necessarily induce an aggressive market behavior of the firm
via output expansion, as shown in Proposition 1 (b), i.e., qsmA1 < q
sm
B1 if γ ≥ γ2.170
Second, when the products are sufficiently complements, firm A will choose a negative CSR level, whereas
firm B chooses a high positive level of CSR. Due to the strong effects of complementarity between the two
products, firm A produces a large amount of product 2, but both firms produce a small amount of product 1.
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Further, as shown in Proposition 1 (b), both firms monotonically decrease their outputs with γ < 910 , even
with a positive level of θsmk . This contrasts with the unilateral case where only one firm adopts CSR, wherein175
the increase of the level of CSR implies an aggressive output production of the firm. However, in a bilateral
case where the firms choose the level of CSR competitively, it will not always increase its output production
at equilibrium because the reaction of its rival’s CSR is endogenously taken into its strategic consideration.
As a result, firm A gets higher profits than firm B, but the substitutability reduces both firms’ profits.
Remark 1: In Appendix B.1, we compare with no delegation case where both firms are pure profit-seekers,180
by setting θi = 0 in Lemma 1, and obtain that market i’s output is increased under both firms’ strategic
CSR. Thus, the managerial delegation with the strategic choice of CSR in a simultaneous movement has
a competitive effect on the market. Note that when the products are sufficiently strong complements, the
multiproduct corporation A adopts negative CSR, which makes that plant A1 reduces its production, but still
increases market output, compared to the no delegation case. Further, regarding profits it can be shown that185
when the products are sufficiently strong complements, firm A’s joint-profits and firm B’s profits increase
under both firms’ strategic CSR. Otherwise, their profits are reduced regardless of product differentiation.
In that case, no adoption of CSR is better off for both firms. Therefore, a prisoner’s dilemma exists between
the two firms, especially when the products are substitutes.
3.2. Sequential choice with CSR-corporation leadership in an output stage190
We address the Stackelberg situation, in which the CSR-corporation A, plays the leading position whereas
the CF firm responds. Using backward induction, the CF firm’s manager chooses qB1 that maximizes eqn.
(6), that is, according to ∂VB
∂qB1
= 0, we have:
qB1 =
1 + qA1 (−1 + θB) + γqA2 (−1 + θB)
3− θB
By inserting qB1(qA1, qA2) into the CSR-corporation manager’s objective function and solving
∂VA
∂qA1
= 0
and ∂VA
∂qA2
= 0 simultaneously, we get the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Under a sequential output competition with CSR-corporation leadership, we obtain the following
equilibrium outputs and profits:
qA1 =
2(−1+γ2)θ2A+(3−θB)(6−4γ−(3−2γ
2)θB)+θA(2(2−γ)γ+5(1−γ2)θB+(−1+γ2)θ2B)
∆2
, qA2 =
(3−θB)(7−5γ−θB)−(4−6γ)θA
∆2
qB1 =
15−3γ−5γ2+2(1−γ2)θ2A+(6+4γ−5γ
2)θB−(3+γ−2γ2)θ2B+θA(−11+7γ
2+2(−1+γ2)θB+(1−γ2)θ2B)
∆2
πA =
N3
2∆22
, πB1 =
N4
2∆22
where ∆2 ≡ 4
(
1− γ2
)
θ2A + (3− θB)
(
21− 10γ2 +
(
−3 + 2γ2
)
θB
)
+ θA
(
− 33 + 25γ2 + 10
(
1− γ2
)
θB
+
(
−1 + γ2
)
θ2B
)
> 0.
By Lemma 2, other things being equal, it can be easily checked that qA1 increases with θA whereas195
qB1 decreases with θA. In addition, qA2 decreases with θA if products are sufficiently strong complements,
9
otherwise qA2 increases with θA, as expected. However, the effect of θB on the equilibrium output depends
on the degree of product differentiation. In particular, qB1 increases with θB whereas qA1 decreases with θB
unless both θA and θB are high enough. Finally, qA2 increases with θB : (i) for small θA when γ < 0 or (ii)
when γ > 0 and both θA and θB are high enough. Otherwise, qA2 decreases with θB .200
In the first stage of the game, firms’ owners simultaneously choose θA and θB to maximize their respective
profits which are given by Lemma 2. The equilibrium strategies at the first stage of the game are found as
a solution to the following system of two equations: ∂πA
∂θA
= 0 and ∂πB1
∂θB
= 0.
We will use a numerical analysis to show equilibrium outcomes. The results of the calculations for various
levels of γ are given in Table 2. In particular, Figure 2 shows that the leader firm, CSR-corporation, chooses205
non-CSR whereas the CF firm’s CSR depends on the degree of product differentiation.
Table 2: Equilibrium outcomes in a sequential choice with CSR-corporation leadership
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
γ
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
θA
AL θB
AL
Figure 2: Strategic level of CSR in a sequential choice with CSR-corporation leadership
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Proposition 2. Under a Stackelberg output competition with multiproduct corporation leadership in a man-
agerial delegation game, we have that
(a) θALA = 0 and θ
AL
B > 0. Also, θ
AL
B is non-monotone in γ when the products are complements, i.e., θ
AL
B
first increases and then decreases in the vicinity of γ = − 910 . When the products are substitutes, however,210
θALB is a convex function of γ, which first decreases and then increases in the vicinity of γ =
2
5 .
(b) qALAi , i = 1, 2., decreases monotonically with γ whereas q
AL
B1 is a convex function of γ, which first decreases
and then increases in the vicinity of γ = 710 . Also, q
AL
A1 ≤ q
AL
A2 , and let γ3 ∈
(
−
3
10 ,−
1
5
)
satisfy qALA1 = q
AL
B1 ,
then qALA1
<
>
qALB1 if γ
>
<
γ3.
(c) πALA > π
AL
B1 > 0 and each firm’s profit decreases with γ.215
Proposition 2 (a) states that when the multiproduct corporation, firm A, is a leader in the output choice
stage, it will not adopt CSR, whereas the follower, firm B, chooses positive CSR in a sequential output
choice game. This is because the leader firm can always commit its optimal output in advance before the
follower chooses, and thus the first-mover advantage in the stage of output choice induces no-CSR when the
owner maximizes its profit only. The profit-oriented CSR is not effective in the managerial delegation game220
when the firm has a first-mover advantage in the sequential-move game.8
It also shows that the follower firm B’s strategic level of CSR is non-monotone and depends on the degree
of product differentiation. In particular, firm B increases CSR level either when the products are sufficiently
complements or substitutes, whereas it decreases otherwise. When the products are sufficiently substitutes,
firm B increases CSR level, which induces a larger output than that of the rival firm, as shown in Proposition225
2 (b). However, when the products are sufficiently complements, even though firm B increases its level of
CSR with the substitutability, the strong effects of complementarity between the two products induce both
firms to produce a small amount of product 1, in which qALA1 > q
AL
B1 . This contrasts with the unilateral
case where only one firm adopts exogenously given CSR wherein the increase of the level of CSR implies an
aggressive output production of the firm. However, Proposition 2 (b) shows that when the unilateral case230
is endogenously chosen in a sequential output choice game, the adoption of higher CSR does not always
support an aggressive production.
Finally, both firms monotonically decrease their outputs with γ < 710 and both firms’ profits decrease
with substitutability.
Remark 2: In Appendix B.2, we compare with no delegation case where both firms are pure profit-seekers,235
by setting θi = 0 in Lemma 2, and obtain that market 1’s output increases, whereas market 2’s output
increases (decreases) when products are complements (substitutes) under firm A’s leadership where only the
8As related work, Hirose et al. (2020) investigated Stackelberg’s price competition where the firms chose ESCR and showed
that only the follower adopts ECSR, but it increases the leaders’ profits under the leader’s first-mover advantage. Further, Lee
and Park (2019) considered the sequential ECSR choice game under the simultaneous price competition and showed that the
follower adopts lower ECSR that increases both firms’ profits.
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firm B adopts strategic CSR. Then, the firm A will reduce output in a competitive market with the firm B,
which will lead to the increasing (decreasing) profits of the firm B (plant A1), compared to the no delegation
case. However, firm A’s joint-profits increase when products are sufficiently strong complements; otherwise,240
they will shrink. Therefore, firm B can utilize CSR’s strategic degree to increase its profit in the competitive
CSR choice game.
3.3. Sequential choice with CF firm leadership in an output stage
We finally address another situation, in which the CF firm B, acts as the leader whereas the CSR-
corporation responds. Similarly, solving ∂VA
∂qA1
= 0 and ∂VA
∂qA2
= 0 simultaneously, we have:
qA1(qB1) =
3−2γ+(−1+γ)θA+qB1(−1+θA)(3−2γ2+(−1+γ2)θA)
9−4γ2+(−6+4γ2)θA−(−1+γ2)θ2A
, qA2(qB1) =
3−2γ+γqB1(−1+θA)+(−1+γ)θA
9−4γ2+(−6+4γ2)θA−(−1+γ2)θ2A
By inserting both qA1(qB1) and qA2(qB1) into the CF firm manager’s objective function and using
∂VB
∂qB1
=
0, we get the following Lemma:245
Lemma 3. Under a sequential output competition with CF firm leadership, we obtain the following equilib-
rium outputs and profits:
qA1 =
N5
∆3
, qA2 =
N6
∆3
,
qB1 =
(3−2γ+(−1+γ)θA)
2(−(5+8γ+3γ2)θA+(1+γ)2θ2A+(2+γ)(3+2γ+(1+γ)θB))
∆3
πA =
N7
2∆23
, πB1 =
N8
2∆23
where ∆3 ≡ 189− 174γ
2 + 40γ4 − 4
(
4− 7γ2 + 3γ4
)
θ3A +
(
1− γ2
)2
θ4A +
(
−36 + 35γ2 − 8γ4
)
θB + θ
2
A
(
90
− 132γ2 + 46γ4 +
(
−4 + 7γ2 − 3γ4
)
θB
)
+ 2θA
(
−4
(
27− 32γ2 + 9γ4
)
+
(
12− 17γ2 + 5γ4
)
θB
)
> 0.
By Lemma 3, other things being equal, it can be easily checked that qA1 increases with θA and qB1
decreases with θA unless both θA and θB are high enough. Further, as usual, it also can be checked that qB1
increases with θB whereas qA1 decreases with θB . Regarding the effect of CSR on the monopolistic market250
2, we have that qA2 decreases with θA if products are sufficiently strong complements, whereas it increases
(decreases) with θB when products are complements (substitutes), as expected.
In the first stage of the game, firms’ owners simultaneously choose θA and θB to maximize their respective
profits which are given by Lemma 3. The equilibrium strategies at the first stage of the game are found as
a solution to the following system of two equations: ∂πA
∂θA
= 0 and ∂πB1
∂θB
= 0.255
We will use a numerical analysis to show equilibrium outcomes. The results of the calculations for various
levels of γ are given in Table 3. In particular, Figure 3 shows that the leader firm, CF firm chooses non-CSR
whereas the CSR-corporation’s CSR depends on the degree of product differentiation.
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Table 3: Equilibrium outcomes in a sequential choice with CF firm leadership
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
γ
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
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BL θB
BL
Figure 3: Strategic level of CSR in a sequential choice with CF firm leadership
Proposition 3. Under a Stackelberg output competition with single plant firm leadership in a managerial
delegation game, we have that260
(a) θBLB = 0 and θ
BL
A becomes positive in the vicinity of γ = −
4
5 . Also, θ
BL
A increases with γ.
(b) qBLki , k = A,B; i = 1, 2, decreases monotonically with γ. Also, q
BL
A1 ≤ q
BL
A2 , and let γ4 ∈
(
0, 110
)
satisfy
qBLA1 = q
BL
B1 , then q
BL
A1
<
>
qBLB1 if γ
>
<
γ4
(c) πBLA > π
BL
B1 > 0 and each firm’s profit decreases with γ.
Proposition 3 (a) states that when the single plant firm B is a leader in the output choice stage, it will265
not adopt CSR whereas the follower, multiproduct corporation A, chooses non-zero (even negative) CSR in
a sequential output choice game. The reason is the same in the case with firm A’s leadership, where the
leader firm can commit its optimal output in advance before the follower chooses. It also shows that the
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follower firm A’s strategic level of CSR is monotone and increases with the degree of product differentiation.
In particular, firm A will choose a positive level of CSR unless the products are sufficiently complements.270
Otherwise, firm A will choose a negative level of CSR. Thus, when the products are sufficiently complements,
firm A adopts a negative level of CSR, i.e., θBLB = 0 > θ
BL
A and thus its output is higher than that of firm
B, but they can raise market prices, as shown in Proposition 3 (b). However, when the products are not
sufficiently complements, firm A adopts a positive level of CSR but its output is not always larger than
that of firm B, as shown in Proposition 3 (b), i.e., qBLA1 < q
BL
B1 when γ ≥ γ4. This also contrasts with the275
unilateral case where only one firm adopts exogenously given CSR wherein the increase of the level of CSR
implies an aggressive output production of the firm. Finally, not only firms’ outputs but both firms’ profits
monotonically decrease with γ.
Remark 3: In Appendix B.3, we compare with no delegation case where both firms are pure profit-seekers,
by setting θi = 0 in Lemma 3, and obtain that market i’s output increases under firm B’s leadership280
where only the firm A adopts strategic CSR. Note that when the products of firm A are sufficiently strong
complements, plant A1 shrinks its outputs, and firm B increases its output, compared to the no delegation
case, which yields that firm B profits increase. Otherwise, firm B decreases its production and its profits
as well. However, as a follower, firm A’s joint-profits always increases irrespective of product differentiation.
Therefore, firm A can utilize the strategic degree of CSR to increase its profit in the competitive CSR choice285
game.
4. Endogenous timing game
We examine the modified format of endogenous timing game where both firms choose its timing to move
between ”early” (t = 1) and ”late” (t = 2) in determining output decisions.9 If both firms choose the same
period, the equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential-move game.290
Table 4 provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game.
Firm A/B tB = 1 tB = 2
tA = 1 (π
sm
A , π
sm
B1 ) (π
AL
A , π
AL
B1 )
tA = 2 (π
BL
A , π
BL
B1 ) (π
sm
A , π
sm
B1 )
Table 4: Payoff Matrix of the Observable Delay Game in a mixed market
In order to find the equilibrium of the endogenous timing output game, we will compare the firms’ profits
under each scenario, which give us the following results:
Lemma 4. Regarding multiproduct corporation profits for any γ ∈ [−1, 1], πBLA > π
sm
A > π
AL
A .
9Regarding model descriptions on the endogenous timing game, see Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Garcia et al. (2019).
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Lemma 5. Regarding single plant firm profits, (i) πBLB1 > π
AL
B1 > π
sm
B1 if γ < −
4
5 ; (ii) π
BL
B1 < π
AL
B1 < π
sm
B1 if295
γ ∈ [− 45 ,
3
5 ); and (iii) π
BL
B1 < π
sm
B1 < π
AL
B1 if γ ∈ [
3
5 , 1].
Using these lemmas, we have the following result:
Proposition 4. The equilibrium of an endogenous timing game is as follows:
(a) If γ ∈ [−1,− 45 ), the only equilibrium is the sequential-move outcome, (tA, tB)=(2, 1), in which the single
plant firm B firm acts as the leader. Furthermore, θBLA < 0 and θ
BL
B = 0.300
(b) If γ ∈ [− 45 , 1], the only equilibrium of the game is the simultaneous move, (tA, tB)=(2, 2). Furthermore,
the equilibrium CSR is positive.
Proposition 4 states that a simultaneous move is an equilibrium when the products are substitutes or
weak complements, whereas a sequential move by the single plant firm’s leadership is an equilibrium when the
products are sufficiently strong complements. In a simultaneous move equilibrium, both firms choose positive305
CSR, but their profits are reduced, compared with no-CSR case by both firms. However, in a sequential
move equilibrium, the leading firm B does not adopt CSR, whereas the multiproduct firm chooses negative
CSR, i.e., CSiR. In that case, both firms can increase profits, compared with a no-CSR case. Therefore, the
degree of product differentiation plays an important role in determining the equilibrium of the endogenous
timing game and the strategic level of CSR or CSiR.310
5. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigated firm’s strategic choice of CSR in a competitive managerial delegation
framework where a multiproduct corporation competes against a single plant firm. We showed that both
firms adopt CSR in a simultaneous move in output choices, whereas only the follower firm adopts CSR, but
the leader firm does not adopt CSR in a sequential move. It implies that the adoption of CSR brings about315
a more intensive product market competition, but the relations between the product differentiation and the
inter-firm interaction in the multiproduct corporation are crucial to determining the strategic level of CSR.
We also showed that when the multiproduct corporation adopts CSR, it might choose a negative level of
CSR when the products are sufficiently strong complements. In both simultaneous and sequential games
in which the firms choose the level of CSR competitively, however, it will not always increase its output320
production at equilibrium where the rival’s CSR is endogenously taken into consideration.
We further examined an endogenous timing game and showed that CSR’s strategic level critically depends
on the degree of product differentiation. We showed that a simultaneous move is an equilibrium when the
products are substitutes or weak complements, whereas a sequential move by a single plant firm’s leadership
is an equilibrium when the products are sufficiently strong complements. Hence, both firms adopt CSR325
unless the products are sufficiently strong complements. Further, in the equilibrium with sequential move in
an endogenous timing game, the multiproduct corporation chooses a negative level of CSR.
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Our work can help shed light on the rationale for the emergence of various equilibria in different industries,
regarding firms’ strategic moves in CSR behaviors, and may be of great interest to the current policy
debate on firms’ CSR. Also, detailed information about the degree of product differentiation and the firm’s330
endogenous choice of the movement should be taken into account if the government intends to evaluate the
welfare effect of firm’s consumer-friendly activities.
Finally, our analysis has limitations in the duopoly modeling with linear demand and symmetric quadratic
cost functions. Further strategic avenues of the firms such as product design and R&D investments should
include different modeling of managerial delegation game and the investigation of real-world evidence. These335
are challenging future research.
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Appendix A. Values of Ni
N1:=300−276γ−85γ2+122γ3−21γ4−5(−1+γ2)
2
θ4
A
−2(102−51γ−60γ2+22γ3+7γ4)θB+(39−6γ−32γ2+2γ3+7γ4)θ2B+2(−1+γ
2)θ3A420
(3(−3−4γ+4γ2)+(−1+γ2)θB)+θ2A
(
67−158γ−13γ2+134γ3−48γ4+(−40+26γ+48γ2−26γ3−8γ4)θB+3(−1+γ2)
2
θ2
B
)
−2θA
(166−169γ−83γ2+119γ3−25γ4+(−89+52γ+82γ2−42γ3−7γ4)θB+(13−3γ−17γ2+3γ3+4γ4)θ2B)
N2:=(3−2γ+(−1+γ)θA)(2+γ−(1+γ)θA+(1+γ)θB)(−3(−6+γ+2γ2)+(3−3γ2)θ2A−(15+γ−8γ
2)θB+θA(−15+9γ2−5(−1+γ2)θB))
N3:=−20(1−γ2)
2
θ4
A
+8(1−γ2)θ3A(7+12γ−10γ
2+4(1−γ2)θB+(−1+γ2)θ2B)+(3−θB)(21−10γ
2+(−3+2γ2)θB)
(
33−30γ+5γ2−2
(
11−
5γ425
−2γ2
)
θB+2(2−γ2)θ2B
)
+θ2
A
(
−4(−120+189γ+74γ2−165γ3+40γ4)−4(119−60γ−151γ2+60γ3+32γ4)θB+
(
129−12γ−218γ2+12γ3+89γ4
)
θ2
B
−14(−1+γ2)
2
θ3
B
+(−1+γ2)
2
θ4
B
)
−2θA(−33+30γ−5γ2−2(−11+5γ+2γ2)θB+2(−2+γ2)θ2B)(−33+25γ
2
−10(−1+γ2)θB+(−1+γ2)θ2B)
N4:=(−45+9γ+15γ2+6(−1+γ2)θ2A+(48−25γ
2)θB+(−9−γ+6γ2)θ2B+θA(33−21γ
2+16(−1+γ2)θB+3(1−γ2)θ2B))
(
−15+3γ+5γ2
+2(−1+γ2)θ2A+(−6−4γ+5γ
2)θB+(3+γ−2γ2)θ2B+θA(11−7γ
2+2(1−γ2)θB−(1−γ2)θ2B)
)
N5:=45−39γ−12γ2+18γ3−4γ4+(8+γ−14γ2−γ3+6γ4)θ3A−(−1+γ
2)
2
θ4
A
+(−18+7γ+14γ2−4γ3−2γ4)θB−θ2A
(
16+11γ−29γ2−9γ3+13γ4430
+(−1+γ)2(2+3γ+γ2)θB
)
+θA(−12+37γ−11γ2−23γ3+12γ4+(12−4γ−15γ2+4γ3+3γ4)θB)
N6:=63−48γ−29γ2+22γ3+(13−18γ−11γ2+14γ3)θ2A+(−1+2γ+γ
2
−2γ3)θ3A−3(4−2γ−2γ
2+γ3)θB+θA
(
−51+52γ+33γ2−31γ3+2
(
2−
γ
−2γ2+γ3
)
θB
)
N7:=(3−2γ)2(1998+738γ−2259γ2−720γ3+783γ4+176γ5−76γ6)+2(−1+γ2)
3
(−28−4γ+21γ2)θ7A−3(−1+γ
2)
4
θ8
A
−2
(
4698−2565γ−7119γ2435
+3651γ3+3766γ4−1737γ5−770γ6+276γ7+40γ8
)
θB+3(468−108γ−819γ2+172γ3+516γ4−92γ5−135γ6+16γ7+12γ8)θ2B+(1−γ
2)
2
θ6
A
(
−
403
−178γ+635γ2+138γ3−254γ4+2γ(2−γ−2γ2+γ3)θB
)
−2(−1+γ2)θ5A
(
613+822γ−1644γ2−1272γ3+1477γ4+482γ5−438γ6+
(
18−39γ−26γ2
+70γ3+2γ4−31γ5+6γ6
)
θB
)
+θ4
A
(
45−8218γ+3663γ2+19070γ3−9170γ4−14450γ5+7359γ6+3566γ7−1905γ8+2
(
−290+333γ+757γ2−863γ3
−637γ4+735γ5+159γ6−205γ7+11γ8
)
θB+(1−γ2)
3
(12−4γ−5γ2)θ2B
)
−2θ3
A
(
5598−12084γ−8213γ2+25311γ3−31γ4−17206γ5+4060γ6440
+3791γ7−1350γ8+(−1812+1526γ+4380γ2−3590γ3−3447γ4+2736γ5+884γ6−672γ7−5γ8)θB+(−1+γ2)
2
(88−32γ−86γ2+22γ3+15γ4)θ2B
)
−2θA
(
19683−20466γ−27765γ2+33255γ3+9908γ4−17549γ5+810γ6+3028γ7−648γ8+
(
−8154+4995γ+15000γ2−8837γ3−9059γ4+4998γ5
+1953γ6−916γ7−76γ8
)
θB+2(468−144γ−1019γ2+291γ3+747γ4−183γ5−216γ6+36γ7+20γ8)θ2B
)
+θ2
A
(
32427−42174γ−50961γ2+78680γ3
+17442γ4−47470γ5+4938γ6+9284γ7−2448γ8−2(5508−3852γ−11805γ2+8000γ3+8214γ4−5313γ5−1931γ6+1129γ7+50γ8)θB+
(
888−
312γ445
−2294γ2+744γ3+2019γ4−564γ5−684γ6+132γ7+71γ8
)
θ2
B
)
N8:=(3−2γ+(−1+γ)θA)2(−(5+8γ+3γ2)θA+(1+γ)2θ2A+(2+γ)(3+2γ+(1+γ)θB))
(
(−15+26γ2−11γ4)θ3A+(1−γ
2)
2
θ4
A
−(2+γ)
(
−63+
42γ
+30γ2−20γ3+(45−23γ−32γ2+18γ3)θB
)
+θ2
A(77−γ−109γ
2+γ3+36γ4+(−10+γ+17γ2−γ3−7γ4)θB)+θA
(
−165+10γ+181γ2−8γ3−46γ4
+(60−6γ−82γ2+6γ3+22γ4)θB
))
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Appendix B. Comparisons of no delegation case vs competitive CSR case
Appendix B.1. Simultaneous choice in output stage
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Appendix B.2. Sequential choice with multiproduct corporation leadership in output stage
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Appendix B.3. Sequential choice with single plant firm leadership in output stage
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